We will study the problem of media control by a government. We will develop a formal model applicable to this question. We will apply the theory of Bayesian persuasion with a privately informed receiver to understand how media censorship regulations affect public actions. We will address the questions of how the effectiveness of media censorship depends on diversity of preferences/opinions of the public and on public access to alternative sources of information. This line of research is a collaboration with Tymofiy Mylovanov, President of Kyiv School of Economics, Co-editor of VoxUkraine (an influential non-government organisation that conducts independent research-based policy analysis by leading scholars, policymakers and businessmen in Ukraine), and Associate Professor at the University of Pittsburgh.
Anton Kolotilin and Andy Zapechelnyuk gave talks on “Delegation Approach to Persuasion” at the University of Chicago and University of Mannheim. The talks presented the most up-to-date results on this line of research.
We will study the problem of food hygiene certification. We will develop a formal model applicable to this question. We will use the differentiation in food hygiene certification methods in England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland to validate our model, and to make policy recommendations. In particular, we will find whether a coarse scale (pass/fail) is superior to a finer scale (e.g., 0 to 5 points), and whether the certification should be optional or mandatory.
Andy Zapechelnyuk gave a talk titled “On the Connection between Persuasion and Delegation” at the 2017 ESSET Conference (European Summer Symposium in Economic Theory, 3-14 July, Gerzensee, Switzerland), organised by CEPR (Centre for Economic Policy Research). This talk presented recent results on the Project’s line of research “Delegation Approach to Persuasion.”
Anton Kolotilin gave a talk on “Persuasion of a privately informed receiver” at the 2017 SAET Conference (Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory), Faro, Portugal, June 25-30.
Andy Zapechelnyuk has organised a session on the frontiers of information design, persuasion and communication at the 2017 SAET Conference (Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory), Faro, Portugal, June 25-30.
The session featured the talks from leading specialists in the field:
- “On the value of persuasion by experts” by Ricardo Alonso (London School of Economics), joint with Odilon Camara (University of Southern California)
- “Relational Communication” by Anton Kolotilin (University of New South Wales), joint with Hongyi Li (University of New South Wales)
- “Disclosure and Pricing of Attributes” by Alex Smolin (University of Bonn)
- “Disclosure and Rollover Risk” by Jack Stecher (Carnegie Mellon University), joint with Michael Ebert (University of Paderborn), Joseph B. Kadane (Carnegie Mellon University), and Dirk Simons (University of Mannheim)
The paper studies persuasion mechanism design (or information design) in linear environments. It addresses a problem in which one party persuades another, privately informed, party to take a certain action. The paper establishes the equivalence of implementation by private and public persuasion mechanisms, and characterises optimal persuasion mechanisms.
Welcome to our research project’s blog.
This is a project that studies persuasion mechanisms and their applications.
The team, Andy Zapechelnyuk from St Andrews and Hisayuki Yoshimoto from Glasgow, together with our colleague from the other side of the world, Anton Kolotilin from UNSW, Sydney, will post news and developments of this project here.