Dates: Tuesdays, July 7 – August 25, 2020
Time: 4-6pm BST London), 5-7pm CEST (Paris), 8-10am PDT (Los Angeles), 11am-1pm EST (New York)
This online seminar series is held in place of the canceled Symposium on Communication and Persuasion (March 13-14, 2020). Each session features two 40-min talks and a 30-min discussion time.
1. Eduardo Perez-Richet (Sciences Po): “Test Design Under Falsification” [Video]
2. Andy Zapechelnyuk (University of St Andrews): “Persuasion Under Insufficient Reason” [Video]
1. Emir Kamenica (Univerity of Chicago): “Information Hierarchies”
2. Konrad Mierendorff (University College London): “Keeping the Listener Engaged: a Dynamic Model of Bayesian Persuasion”
1. Joel Sobel (University of California – San Diego): “Functional Language in Games”
2. Doron Ravid (University of Chicago): “Persuasion via Weak Institutions”
1. Nicholas Yannelis (University of Iowa): “Persuasion in an Asymmetric Information Economy”
2. Mofei Zhao (Beihang University): “Global Manipulation by Local Obfuscation”
1. Yingni Guo (Northwestern University): “Costly Miscalibration”
2. Ron Siegel (Pennsylvania State University): “Pareto Improving Segmentation of Multi-Product Market”
1. Laura Doval (Columbia University): “Nonlinear Pricing with Downstream Markets”
2. Ricardo Alonso (London School of Economics): “Tampering with Information”
Registration: If you would like to be added to the mailing list to receive Zoom login details, please fill this form: https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSc3Sq3GGNDEIa5lcbda9a45sjVldHZrJlRKH-jyPobZ1oE2Aw/viewform?usp=sf_link
The seminar series is co-organized by Andy Zapechelnyuk (University of St Andrews) and Teddy Kim (Emory University), and held in conjunction with the special Economic Theory Issue on Communication and Persuasion, edited by Andy Zapechelnyuk and Teddy Kim.
This seminar series is sponsored by Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC)
The seminars are held via Zoom under Emory University license.