Andy Zapechelnyuk gave a talk titled “On the Connection between Persuasion and Delegation” at the 2017 ESSET Conference (European Summer Symposium in Economic Theory, 3-14 July, Gerzensee, Switzerland), organised by CEPR (Centre for Economic Policy Research). This talk presented recent results on the Project’s line of research “Delegation Approach to Persuasion.”
Anton Kolotilin gave a talk on “Persuasion of a privately informed receiver” at the 2017 SAET Conference (Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory), Faro, Portugal, June 25-30.
Andy Zapechelnyuk has organised a session on the frontiers of information design, persuasion and communication at the 2017 SAET Conference (Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory), Faro, Portugal, June 25-30.
The session featured the talks from leading specialists in the field:
- “On the value of persuasion by experts” by Ricardo Alonso (London School of Economics), joint with Odilon Camara (University of Southern California)
- “Relational Communication” by Anton Kolotilin (University of New South Wales), joint with Hongyi Li (University of New South Wales)
- “Disclosure and Pricing of Attributes” by Alex Smolin (University of Bonn)
- “Disclosure and Rollover Risk” by Jack Stecher (Carnegie Mellon University), joint with Michael Ebert (University of Paderborn), Joseph B. Kadane (Carnegie Mellon University), and Dirk Simons (University of Mannheim)
The research paper titled “Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver” by Anton Kolotilin, Tymofiy Mylovanov, Andriy Zapechelnyuk, and Ming Li is accepted for publication to Econometrica.
The paper studies persuasion mechanism design (or information design) in linear environments. It addresses a problem in which one party persuades another, privately informed, party to take a certain action. The paper establishes the equivalence of implementation by private and public persuasion mechanisms, and characterises optimal persuasion mechanisms.