Dates: Tuesdays, July 7 – August 25, 2020
Time: 4-6pm BST (London), 5-7pm CEST (Paris), 8-10am PDT (Los Angeles), 11am-1pm EST (New York)
This online seminar series is held in place of the canceled Symposium on Communication and Persuasion (March 13-14, 2020). Each session features two 40-min talks and a 30-min discussion time.
1. Eduardo Perez-Richet (Sciences Po): “Test Design Under Falsification” [Video]
2. Andy Zapechelnyuk (University of St Andrews): “Persuasion Under Insufficient Reason” [Video]
1. Emir Kamenica (Univerity of Chicago): “Information Hierarchies” [Video]
2. Konrad Mierendorff (University College London): “Keeping the Listener Engaged: a Dynamic Model of Bayesian Persuasion”
1. Joel Sobel (University of California – San Diego): “Functional Language in Games” [Video]
2. Doron Ravid (University of Chicago): “Persuasion via Weak Institutions” [Video]
1. Nicholas Yannelis (University of Iowa): “Persuasion in an Asymmetric Information Economy” [Video]
2. Mofei Zhao (Beihang University): “Global Manipulation by Local Obfuscation” [Video]
1. Yingni Guo (Northwestern University): “Costly Miscalibration” [Video]
2. Ron Siegel (Pennsylvania State University): “Designing and Selling Hard Information” [Video]
1. Laura Doval (Columbia University): “Product Line Design under Limited Commitment” [Video]
2. Ricardo Alonso (London School of Economics): “Tampering with Information” [Video]
The seminar series is co-organized by Teddy Kim (Emory University) and Andy Zapechelnyuk (University of St Andrews), and held in conjunction with the special Economic Theory Issue on Communication and Persuasion, edited by Teddy Kim and Andy Zapechelnyuk.
This seminar series is sponsored by Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC)
The seminars are held via Zoom under Emory University license.